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The legal principle of comparability has formally guided federal white- 
collar wage policy for the last twenty years. The legislation requires 
that “federal pay rates be comparable with private enterprise pay rates 
for the same levels of work.”’ The principle has been interpreted and 
enforced to equalize wages between the federal and private sectors. 
Recent evidence suggests this objective has not been attained. Seminal 
work by  Smith (1976,  1977, 1981) and Quinn (1979) indicates federal 
workers may be “overpaid” relative to their private sector counterparts 
by as much as 15 percent to 20 percent. 
This chapter makes two additional contributions to the compara- 
bility debate. The first is another attempt to determine if  federal and 
private sector wages are “equal” as mandated by current federal wage 
guidelines. Since individual productivity differences are valid reasons 
for pay differences between sectors, we extend the approach of Smith 
and Quinn to control for the effects of both observed and unobserved 
worker  quality in  order to isolate residual  wage inequality between 
sectors. 
The second contribution is an attempt to motivate a more choice- 
theoretic treatment of public-private wage differences. This approach 
is based on a simple supply interpretation of  wage “comparability”: 
as a cost-minimizing employer, the public sector would set wages just 
high  enough  to attract the required  work  force.  This interpretation 
appears to be the original motivation for comparability legislation. The 
approach suggests that if  there exist equalizing differences in pay for 
nonpecuniary job attributes of each sector, a policy of equal wages is 
inappropriate. To  resolve the issue of a “comparable”  wage, we de- 
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velop and estimate a model of sectoral job attachment to identify the 
wage differential consistent with this interpretation of comparability. 
7.1  Introduction and Overview 
Pay comparability  between the public and private  sectors is sup- 
ported by both equity and efficiency arguments. Equity considerations 
dictate a worker do no better or worse in the public sector than in the 
private sector. Efficiency considerations imply that the federal sector 
pays no more than is necessary to attract an adequate supply of em- 
ployees. Equal pay, it is presumed, will lead to “fair” competition for 
workers between the public and private sectors. 
Several previous  studies have attempted to determine if equal pay 
in  the public  sector has  been  attained.  They  have  employed  wage 
regressions to adjust observed differentials for observed quality and 
productivity  differences  among workers.  Inability  to  “explain”  pay 
differences by measured characteristics is taken as evidence that equal 
pay  is  not  the rule.  Unexplained  or residual  differences in pay  are 
interpreted as quasi rents to employment in the higher-paying sector. 
The present analysis addresses two alternative interpretations of the 
“unexplained”  difference between public and private wages. The first 
is unobserved differences in the productivity of workers in each sector. 
Despite the availability of  large samples and detailed  information in 
recent microdata files, we can never fully capture all worker-specific 
differences. If workers are sorted between sectors on the basis of these 
unobserved factors, the unexplained component of wage regressions 
may be more properly interpreted as individual differences rather than 
quasi rents. One goal of the present  analysis is to extend the wage 
regression approach to adjust for the effects of  observed and unob- 
served productivity-related personal characteristics. 
The second interpretation  of  the unexplained  difference  between 
public and private sector wages is equalizing (or compensating) wage 
differences for nonpecuniary job attributes. Workers may perceive fun- 
damental differences between the public and private sectors. Distin- 
guishing features of each sector, which may be viewed either favorably 
or unfavorably by workers,  include stability of employment, oppor- 
tunity for internal promotion, unique nature of public service, pace of 
work, the bureaucratic work environment, and so forth. If the “return” 
from a job is viewed as a package containing both wage and nonwage 
components, then part of any public-private wage difference may be 
an equalizing difference for the nonwage job attributes. If workers trade 
off wages for these job attributes, a policy of  “equal wages”  between 
sectors may lead to a federal wage scale that neither equalizes overall 
“returns”  to workers in each sector nor elicits the appropriate supply 
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If  wage differences between sectors are, in part, equalizing differ- 
ences, how can one determine if the federal sector “overpays”? Unlike 
the problem of unobserved productivity, the effects of equalizing dif- 
ferences cannot easily be dealt with in a wage regression framework. 
In particular, the conventional approach of standardizing wages for the 
effects of nonwage job attributes cannot be applied because some of 
the fundamental differences between the federal and private sectors 
(e.g., serving the public) cannot be easily measured.2 The alternative 
approach adopted here is to  judge whether the government “overpays” 
based on implicit queues for public sector jobs. If the difference be- 
tween public and private wage offers exceeds the equalizing difference 
in pay necessary to offset the difference between nonwage job aspects, 
then more individuals will desire government employment than there 
are public sector jobs. The wage differential that “just” eliminates the 
queue is, in a simple supply sense, the “comparable” wage differential. 
The present analysis formulates and estimates a model of sectoral 
attachment at the individual level that permits rough calculation of the 
length of implicit queues for federal sector jobs. We  identify determi- 
nants of worker preferences for federal sector employment and deter- 
minants  of  federal  sector hiring  choices. The separate decisions of 
employee and employer together determine whether the worker will 
be employed in the government sector. More important, identification 
of the separate decisions permits a test for the existence of queues for 
federal jobs by revealing excess desired demand for government jobs 
at a given relative public-private wage. A related advantage of directly 
specifying the sectoral attachment mechanism is that it can be incor- 
porated into the wage regression method to adjust observed differen- 
tials for both observed and unobserved productivity characteristics. 
Before proceeding, one shortcoming of the model deserves mention. 
This study focuses only on the wage component of pecuniary com- 
pensation. The principle of comparability has only recently been ap- 
plied to nonwage  compensation  (Carow  1981). Although  the  model 
deals with nonwage job attributes, the analysis is geared to those at- 
tributes, unlike fringe benefits, that cannot be manipulated by employ- 
ers. Of course the existence of positive public-private wage differentials 
would be of less consequence if  offset by other forms of pecuniary 
compensation such as fringe benefits. However, there is ample evidence 
this is not the case (Quinn l979,1982a, 1982b; Bellante and Long 1981). 
These studies suggest that federal-private wage differentials may un- 
derstate total compensation differentials. 
The results suggest that wage equality between similar workers in 
the federal and private sectors was not achieved in 1982. After adjusting 
for both observed and unobserved productivity characteristics, we find 
that the federal wage structure exceeds the private sector wage struc- 
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attempt to estimate the wage differential that eliminates implicit queues 
for federal sector jobs. For the marginal worker this is the wage dif- 
ferential that equalizes the attractiveness of total compensation (wage 
and nonwage) packages offered by each sector. The estimates suggest 
that elimination of queues would be achieved by reducing federal wages 
for males about 16 percent and federal wages for females by about 42 
percent. 
Section 7.2 briefly outlines the objectives of comparability legislation 
and the pay-setting mechanism in the federal government. Section 7.3 
briefly reviews the wage regression approach and provides the moti- 
vation for the empirical work that follows.  Section 7.4 lays out the 
employer-employee matching model that is central to our approach, 
and section 7.5 discusses econometric issues. The description of data 
sources and presentation of  results are contained in sections 7.6 and 
7.7 respectively. The findings are summarized in the final section. 
7.2  Setting Pay in the Federal Sector 
The federal government employs several different systems to deter- 
mine pay. Slightly under one-half of all federal civilian employees (mostly 
white collar) are classified under the General Schedule (GS) pay system. 
Another fifth (mostly blue collar) fall under the Federal Wage System 
(FWS). Remaining workers are covered by the Postal Service Schedule 
or one of several smaller pay plans for other agencies. 
Each of the major federal pay  systems is linked to private sector 
rates of pay. Reasons for doing so are set forth in the Federal Salary 
Reform Act of  1962 which established the comparability principle for 
workers covered by the GS: 
Adoption of the principle of comparability will insure equity for the 
federal employee with his equals throughout the national economy- 
enable the government to compete fairly with private firms for qual- 
ified personnel-and  provide at least a logical and factual standard 
for setting Federal Salaries. (Reprinted in President’s Panel on Fed- 
eral Compensation 1976, 8) 
Having set this objective, an elaborate mechanism was estabished 
to annually adjust federal pay to private pay rates. In March of each 
year the Bureau of  Labor Statistics undertakes a national white-collar 
salary survey. This information is used to assign rates of pay to jobs 
in  the public  sector such  that  federal pay  rates  are comparable  to 
“private enterprise pay rates for the same levels of w01-k.”~  A number 
of  factors interfere with  pursuit  of  this  objective.  First,  it  is often 
difficult to compare jobs in the public sector with jobs in the private 
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nical problems with the BLS survey may make the private sector com- 
parison group a biased sample of all private sector  worker^.^ Finally, 
in nine of the past thirteen years, and not  since  1976, have the pay 
raises suggested by the technical analyses been fully accepted by the 
executive and legislative branches.  As a consequence there is good 
reason  to suspect that  the comparability  process may  have  strayed 
from its objective. 
Although in principle federal wage schedules assign rates of pay to 
jobs not to individuals, in application the system provides some flex- 
ibility to tailor  compensation to fit  individuals.  To  attract  or retain 
workers, while remaining within the confines of the GS or FWS, federal 
employers can reclassify jobs upward  (grade creep), speed up pro- 
motions, lower credentials for jobs, or give unduly large credit to pre- 
vious work experience. In addition, upper-level managers are eligible 
for merit pay bonuses. Borjas (1980) presents some evidence on wage 
variation within the federal sector. 
7.3  The Wage Regression Approach 
The wage regression approach used by both Smith and Quinn has 
previously  been  applied to race and sex differentials.  An important 
distinction between these applications and the present application is 
that sectoral attachment, unlike race and sex, is a “choice”  variable. 
The method compares earnings or wages between similar workers in 
each sector. It poses the hypothetical question What would a person 
with some given set of observed characteristics (education, sex, race, 
etc.) earn in each sector? Unexplained or residual differences in pay 
between  sectors are interpreted as quasi rents to employment in the 
higher-paying sector. 
A serious empirical problem arises because choices not taken are 
not observed. Associated with each worker is a public sector wage or 
a private sector wage, but never both. The wage a private sector worker 
would earn if  he were to obtain a public sector job is not observed, 
nor is the wage a government worker would earn in a private sector 
job. Direct wage comparisons are impossible. The best one can do is 
somehow impute an alternative wage for each worker. Inevitably this 
requires basing the analysis on workers employed in one sector or the 
other. 
Smith and Quinn perform these imputations using the results of OLS 
wage equations fitted to each sector. Parameter estimates based  on 
employed  private  sector workers  are used  to predict  what  “public 
sector workers would earn in the private sector.”5 The portion of the 
wage differential that cannot be explained by differences in measured 
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extent of overpayment: a quasi rent to employment in the higher-paying 
sector. 
Such an interpretation, however, hinges on two crucial assumptions. 
First, the disturbances in each wage equation are classically behaved. 
This assumption implies that given observed personal characteristics, 
workers are randomly distributed across sectors. Yet  this restriction 
may be inconsistent with even the simplest models of  employee and 
employer behavior which suggest sectoral attachment is a choice vari- 
able. Each employment match is the end result of a search process in 
which employees attempt to choose the job offering the greatest net 
advantage and employers try to obtain labor at the lowest cost. Many, 
if  not most, of the factors involved in these choices (worker and em- 
ployer preferences, job attributes, worker quality, etc.) are measured 
only imperfectly. If the matching process is effective, we expect that, 
say, a worker with unobserved skills valued most in one sector to be 
observed working in  that sector. Thus self-selected (or firm-selected) 
samples, which imply different unobserved productivity characteristics 
of workers in each sector, may provide an alternative explanation of 
residual wage differences predicted by the wage regression technique. 
The second assumption crucial to the Smith-Quinn interpretation is 
that pay differentials do not represent equalizing differences for non- 
pecuniary job attributes of each sector. If workers view the federal and 
private  sectors as offering fundamentally different  quantities of  im- 
portant nonwage job attributes, then workers will, in general, not face 
the same wage offers from each sector. The worker side of an employer- 
employee match suggests that workers desire employment in the sector 
offering the most advantageous package of job attributes and wages. 
For some workers higher public sector wages may not be enough to 
offset dissatisfaction with nonwage aspects of public sector jobs. Other 
workers may view public sector jobs more favorably. 
In a competitive labor market, distributions of preferences across 
workers  and nonwage attributes across jobs together determine the 
market trade-off between components of the total (pecuniary and non- 
pecuniary) compensation package.6 The presumption of “equilibrium” 
that  permits interpretation of  market trade-offs  as equalizing differ- 
ences in pay is open to question in the public sector. Thus without the 
“equilibrium”  assumption, it is difficult to distinguish equalizing dif- 
ferences from noncompetitive quasi rents. 
The above  arguments suggest that  wage differences between  the 
public and private sectors can be decomposed into four “sources”:  (a) 
observed productivity or skill differences, (b)  unobserved productivity 
or skill differences, (c) equalizing differences in pay for nonpecuniary 
job attributes, and (d) quasi rents or overpayment by government em- 
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is directed toward the distinction between (a)  and (4,  but their frame- 
work can be modified to also consider (6) and (c).  Let the (log) wage 
offer to the ith individual by thejrh  sector (federal or private) be given 
by 
(1)  w;  = z!ai  -1 -  +  + aj  + q;;  j  =JP; 
where Zi  is a vector of  individual productivity characteristics, and Sf 
and Sp  are vectors of  sector-specific  weights.  The p{ represent the 
value of unobserved (to the analyst) productivity in each sector. With- 
out loss of generality they are scaled to have zero mean in the popu- 
lation. The ajrepresent the market evaluation of nonwage job attributes 
in each sector and the qj  are white noise. 
The two assumptions required to interpret the unexplained residual 
as a quasi rent can be more formally stated. Let Sj  be a binary variable 
that takes on a value of  unity if  the irh individual is observed to be 
employed  in  the federal sector and a value  of  zero otherwise.  The 
assumption of no worker sorting implies that unobserved productivity 
characteristics are distributed randomly across sectors: 
(2)  E(pySi =  1)  = E(FySi = 0) = 0;  j  =AP. 
The assumption of no equalizing differences in pay implies 
(3)  E(af)  = E(aP). 
If both of these assumptions are satisfied, then separate wage regres- 
sions estimated on subsamples of  public and private sector workers 
will yield consistent estimates of S f and 5 p. These parameter estimates 
can be used  to decompose the observed wage differential into “ex- 
plained”  and “unexplained”  components. This decomposition is gen- 
erally evaluated at the sample means (indicated by bars):7 
(4)  AW = wf  -  WP  = (Zf  -  3)’F  + (Ftf - p)’Z. 
The first term  of  the decomposition measures the part of the gross 
differential attributable to sectoral differences in the productivity char- 
acteristics of  workers. The second term measures the quasi rent  to 
sectoral attachment. 
We  consider next the effect of  relaxing assumptions (2) and (3) on 
the interpretation of the decomposition in equation (4). First, if workers 
are sorted between  sectors on the basis of unobserved  productivity 
characteristics, assumption (2)  will be violated. Empirical disturbances 
for the wage functions of observed workers in each sector (the esti- 
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the population distributions of  pfand p.  For workers employed in the 
public sector, expected wages are 
E(w$/S~  = 1) = Zfcf  + E(p.YSi = l), 
and for workers in the private sector: 
E(WpIsi = 0) = 2;tjp  + E(pp/si = 0). 
Wage  regressions based on samples of  observed workers may  be 
misspecified due to an omitted variable measuring the expected effect 
of  unobserved productivity characteristics given sectoral choice.* Es- 
timated tjj may be biased. In the context of  the wage decomposition 
discussed above, the effects of omitted productivity will be captured 
by the unexplained component z’(ijf -  ij p). Unobserved productivity 
differences between workers in each sector may account for what pre- 
viously appeared to be quasi rents. Thus if  assumption (2) does not 
hold consistent, estimates of  tjj can only be obtained by jointly con- 
sidering the wage and sector choice (Si  = 0,l) functions. 
A more difficult problem to deal with is the presence of unmeasured 
job attributes. The UJ’ in equation (1) represents market trade-off be- 
tween wage offers and nonpecuniary job attributes in each se~tor.~ 
Ignoring complications due to unobserved productivity, violation of the 
“no equalizing differences” assumption (3) yields a wage decomposition: 
AW  = ~f  -  WP = (zf  -  @)rH  + (q  - y)’zJ  + (~f  -  UP). 
The part of  the gross differential not explained by  differences in 
productive characteristics is comprised of  “overpayment”  of (p - 
gp)rz  and the market value of  nonwage job attributes (af - up). The 
coefficients on the intercepts in the wage regression model will capture 
(uf - up), but because the difference in  intercepts depends on the 
scaling and measurement of  the 2 variables, one cannot retrieve (uf 
-  up) (see Jones 1983). Thus equalizing differences may also account 
for what previously appeared to be quasi rents to sectoral attachment. 
The troublesome effects of  unobserved productivity characteristics 
(p!)  and equalizing differences (UJ) both arise from the sorting of work- 
ers between sectors. In the unobserved productivity case, workers end 
up in the sector yielding the greatest return to unobserved skills, all 
else constant. In the equalizing differences, case workers choose the 
sector where, say, they “spend” the least for desirable  job attributes. 
However, the two effects are quite different because payment to the 
is worker-specific, but payment of  uJ  determined at the market level 
is not worker-specific. As a result, the uj will be independent of sectoral 
choice at the individual level. Unlike the troublesome effects of unob- 155  Wages in the Federal and Private Sectors 
served productivity, joint consideration of individual sectoral choice 
and wage offers will not resolve the problem. In the context of  the 
wage  regression approach  to differentials, there  is no easy way  to 
separate the effects of equalizing differences from quasi rents. 
7.4  Queues and the Determination of Federal Employment 
The preceding section suggests that the method of  wage decompo- 
sition often employed to analyze wage differentials may fail to disen- 
tangle quasi rents to employment in  the government sector from the 
effects of either unobserved productivity characteristics or equalizing 
differences in pay. We consider an alternative approach to this problem. 
The approach is motivated by the simple supply argument that appears 
to be the original objective of comparability legislation; a cost-minimizing 
federal employer would set wages no higher than necessary to attract 
the required work force. If wages are above this level, the government 
“overpays.”  Workers seeking quasi rents to government employment 
will queue up for federal jobs. 
Evidence of  queues is our indicator of overpayment. As a practical 
matter the length and composition of these queues will rarely be ob- 
served. It is likely that many workers who desire federal jobs at current 
relative wages are employed in the private sector and never formally 
seek employment. To determine whether the federal government over- 
pays, we need to identify these workers. 
In the absence of direct observation of worker preferences for federal 
sector employment, we develop below a simple model of the “match- 
ing”  or sorting process between workers and employers. The model 
is used to determine the length and composition of queues. An addi- 
tional advantage is that the selection mechanism central to this model 
enables us to adjust wage regressions for the biasing effects of unob- 
served productivity characteristics. 
The model contains two sectors (public and private) and many work- 
ers. To focus attention on the fundamental differences between sectors 
(job security, unique nature of public service, bureaucratic work en- 
vironment, etc.) we assume all employers within each sector are ho- 
mogeneous. According to our characterization,  certain nonwage job 
attributes are intrinsic to the government in its capacity as employer. 
These attributes are thus considered fixed-neither  sector can provide 
the unique attributes of the other sector at any cost. It follows that 
employers in  each sector are primarily  concerned  with wage offers 
(given the  market value of job attributes)  rather than  manipulating 
packages of wages and job attributes. 
Unlike employers, who are of only two types, workers have heter- 
ogeneous tastes and preferences. Associated with each sector is a wage 
structure that relates the wage offered each worker to the worker’s 156  Steven F.  Venti 
bundle of productivity characteristics. We assume all workers are  aware 
of the best wage offers they could obtain in each sector. We  focus on 
two choices; one by employees and one by employers. 
First, at the prevailing public-private relative wage, workers decide 
whether they prefer public or private sector employment. At the same 
time federal employers, perhaps anticipating queues for jobs, decide 
how  they  will  select workers from the pool of  potential employees 
demanding jobs. Given exogenous (legislated) levels of both employ- 
ment and the federal wage scale, employers adopt a set of hiring stan- 
dards to ration workers from the queue.  lo 
A worker will be employed in a particular sector if the worker both 
desires employment in that sector and the sector chooses to hire the 
worker. In addition, some workers may be either unemployed or out 
of the labor force. In the present analysis we deal only with employed 
persons. Moreover, we  assume all workers can obtain a job in  the 
private sector if  needed, although many of these workers may prefer 
employment in the public sector. This assumption is consistent with 
the presumption of implicit queues for government jobs, that is, many 
private sector workers may prefer federal sector  jobs at current relative 
wages between the sectors. 
We  call the sector preference decision of  workers the “job accep- 
tance” decision because it implicitly answers the hypothetical question 
Would the individual accept  a federal sector job if  offered (at some 
specified relative wage)? We  call the employer decision to ration em- 
ployment  the  “job offer”  decision because it implicitly answers the 
hypothetical question Would the federal sector offer this individual a 
job if  the individual applied? The job acceptance decision is based on 
a utility comparison between packages of wages and nonwage job at- 
tributes offered by each sector. The job offer decision follows from 
cost minimizing behavior by employers. In particular, the federal sector 
attempts to  select those workers from the queue (identified by pro- 
ductivity characteristics) that are most productive given the wage the 
federal sector must offer. 
It is also important to recognize that the hiring standards employed 
by the federal sector at a particular time are derived from a single point 
on the public sector demand curve for labor. At this point the wage is 
above the “competitive” level and queues result. The  job offer decision 
summarizes how workers are chosen from the queues. At other points 
on the public sector demand curve-representing  say, alternative bud- 
gets specifying different wage and employment levels-different hiring 
standards will be in effect. 
This narrow formulation of the job offer decision is the consequence 
of not modeling the general equilibrium determination of public and 
private sector wages at the macrolevel.  Thus one must bear in mind 
that the hiring standards we specify may be useful predictions of the 157  Wages in the Federal and Private Sectors 
likelihood of choosing a marginal worker from the queue, but the same 
hiring standards would be inappropriate for nonmarginal changes in 
any of the factors that affect the length of the queue.'' 
More formally, we consider first the worker, or  job acceptance side, 
of  the employment match.  For each individual the decision to seek 
work in a particular sector will depend on the worker's  evaluation of 
nonwage job attributes offered and on the potential wage that could be 
earned in each sector. The federal sector is fundamentally different 
from the private  sector due to certain nonwage  aspects of  the job. 
Workers with different characteristics may vary in their evaluation of 
the nonwage aspects of each sector. These heterogeneous preferences 
may, in part, be represented by worker characteristicsXi. Worker choice 
between sectors also depends on relative wages.  We  denote the log 
wage differential between sectors as (wf -  wp), where wf and wp  are 
the log wage offers individual  i would receive should the individual 
obtain employment in the federal (f) or private (p) sectors. We represent 
worker preference or desire for employment in  each sector by y  and 
hp  where1* 
(5)  hf =  + d(wf -  wP) + ef; 
The @j  indicate the relationship between measured characteristics and 
tastes for work in each sector. The d measure the sensitivity of worker 
sectoral choice to the relative wage differential. Thus the @ 's and a's 
together characterize each individual's evaluation of job packages of- 
fered by each sector. The e' represent unobserved worker heterogeneity. 
From equation (5) it follows that an individual will desire to work in 
the federal sector if hf -  hp  > 0. Let PI = W - hp  be 
(6)  P1 = X;(V - ep) + (orf -  ap)(uJ -  wp) + (6 - ep) 
If  sectoral attachment  were purely  a  supply decision, this equation 
would determine sectoral choice. However the proportion of workers 
desiring federal employment may exceed the number of jobs available 
in the government sector. For example, a private sector worker may 
be qualified for and desire a post office job at some favorable (to the 
worker) wf -  wp,  yet the worker can do no more than queue up for 
the job. 
To determine observed sectoral attachment we need to bring in the 
employer or job offer side of  each match. At issue are the standards 
used by the federal sector to ration the queue of potential employees. 158  Steven F.  Venti 
We  assume the objective of the federal sector is to maximize worker 
productivity per dollar spent on labor input. Toward this end we define 
a job offer function that evaluates each potential employee by produc- 
tivity characteristics (&)  and the absolute cost wf. Let P2  be an index 
of the desirability of a worker to the federal government: 
(7)  P2 = X&  + a2wf + e2. 
The matching process that generates observed sectoral attachment 
can now be made more explicit.  Since neither P, nor P2  are directly 
observed, we can arbitrarily scale each such that Pj > 0 indicates that 
a worker will accept a public sector job 0'  = 1) or the government will 
hire the worker (j = 2) and Pj 5  0 indicates that the worker does not 
desire a public sector job (j = 1) or will not be hired 0' = 2). Then, a 
worker is employed in the federal sector with probability: 
P'  = Prob[P, > 0, P2 > 01. 
We  emphasize that the functions PI  and P2  are population relation- 
ships in the above model.  All workers have relative preferences for 
federal versus private sector work, and the public sector can potentially 
evaluate all workers. P1  tells us which workers implicitly enter the 
queue, and P2  indicates which individuals will be chosen.  l3 Some work- 
ers who would be acceptable to the federal government do not desire 
federal employment and thus remain in the private sector. Similarly, 
many private sector workers may desire employment in the federal 
sector but are never hired. It is in this spirit that we refer to Pl(.) as 
the job acceptance  decision (Would the individual  accept a federal 
sector job if  offered?) and P2(.) as the job offer decision (Would the 
federal sector hire an individual if that individual were to appear in the 
queue?). 
7.5  Estimation Issues 
Equation (8) indicates that an individual will be observed to be em- 
ployed in the federal sector with bivariate probability P'. The proba- 
bility of observing an individual to be employed in the private sector 
is 1 - P'.  If both wf and wp  are known for each worker and el and e2 
are distributed joint normal, the parameters of PI  and P2  can be esti- 
mated directly.14 
Poirer (1980) has shown that identification can be achieved through 
a single exclusion restriction. The problem is one of choosing variables 
that determine either the job acceptance or job offer decisions, but not 
both.  As  a practical  matter we believe there are several defensible 
restrictions  we can impose. However, rather than relying solely on 159  Wages in the Federal and Private Sectors 
exclusion restriction, we also tap an additional source of identification 
by using information on prior employment status of individuals. 
Let S,-l  and S,  indicate employment status in periods t - 1  and t 
respectively, where S,  = 0 indicates private sector attachment and S, 
= 1 indicates federal sector attachment. Further identification is pro- 
vided by assuming that all workers with federal sector jobs in period 
t - 1  may, if  they choose, remain employed in the federal sector in 
period I, that is, all federal sector separations are voluntary. Evidence 
for 1982, the year of our data, provides support for this assumption. 
For example, executive branch employment dropped by over 113,000 
in the first two years of the Reagan administration. Over 90 percent of 
this reduction was achieved through normal processes of attrition (and 
early retirement) rather than by reduction-in-force  procedures (sepa- 
rations, downgrades, or lateral reassignments).15 
Let nmn be the probability of observing an individual with employ- 
ment pattern s,-,  = m and S,  = n.  This assumption implies the like- 
lihood that an individual will be observed to make the {S,-l = 1, S, = 
0) transition is the joint probability  of being offered a federal job in 
period t (Pz > 0), but not accepting it (PI 5  0):I6 
(9)  n10 = Prob[P1 5  0, P2 > 01. 
For the individual known to make this transition, other combinations 
of job acceptance and offer decisions resulting in private employment 
([PI > 0, P2 5  01  and [(P1 5  0, P2 I  01)  are assumed to occur with 
zero probability. 
The likelihoods of observing remaining transition patterns of  em- 
ployment are unaffected by the assumption. We  have 
(10)  TOO  = Prob[P, 5  0, P2 > 01  + Prob[P, 5  0, P25  01 
+ Prob[P1 > 0, P2  5 01 
= 1 - Prob[P, > 0, P2 > 01; 
nol = Prob[P, > 0, P2 > 01; 
IT"  = FYob[P, > 0, P2  > 01. 
For workers in the federal sector in period  t, we cannot distinguish 
between transitions {S,-l = 0, S, = 1)  and {S,-l = 1, S, = l}, so n1 
we can distinguish between those employed in the government sector 
in the prior period (do)  and those not employed in the private sector 
in the prior period  (TOO). 
Both wage offers &and  wp enter each of the nmn.  Up to this point 
we have considered them known. Although individual workers may be 
-  - no1 = n1l. However, for workers in the private sector in period  t 160  Steven F.  Venti 
aware of wage offers in each sector, the observed data contain one or 
the other. We  deal with this problem by explicitly incorporating these 
wage offers in the model. To do so, a slight reparameterization is useful. 
Let ~f  = Z’ef and 6~’  =  Z’Sp. Then equations (l), (6), and (7) can be 
rewritten (omitting individual subscripts) as 
(1 1)  P1  = x;pl + al(+f - @)  +  €1  = p: + €1; 
wf = Z’Y  + €3; 
wp  = Z‘y + €4; 
where, 
el = aI(e  - e4)  + el; 
e2 = (~2~3  + e2; 
€3  = pf + qf; 
€4  =  clp + rlp. 
The unidentified d  are captured by coefficients on the intercept con- 
tained in 2.  To maintain full generality, the reduced form disturbances 
are jointly distributed with densityf(E,,  E~,  e3,  e4). 
We  can now derive the likelihood function of the sample. Using our 
earlier classification scheme we can partition sample observations into 
three categories. These categories and the contribution of each to the 
likelihood function of  the sample are 
1. All federal sector workers: 
@I  = ~11  = Pr[PI  > 0, P2 > 0,  wf  - Gf]; 
2. Private sector workers with prior federal sector status: 
~10  = Pr[P, 5 0,  P2 > 0,  wp -  *PI; 
3. Private sector workers with no prior federal sector status: 
Too  = 1 -  Pr[P1 > 0, P2  > 0,  wp -  $PI. 
Since wf  and wp  are never both observed for the same individual, each 
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“integrating  out”  either e3 or e4. For  example, al0  is based on the 
density 
m 
which enables us to calculate: 
-Pi  m 
-s  -p; 
a10 =  J  J  g(€lr  €2, wp - W)d€2d€l 
Remaining probabilities are based on similar expressions. 
Let nl, n2, n3 refer to the subsamples of  observations from the ap- 
propriate categories. The natural log of the likelihood function of  the 
sample is 
L  = c  log(n1) + c  log(a’0) +  log(n00), 
“1  “2  “3 
where  IT^  = aol  = 19’.  The model described by this likelihood function 
may be considered an endogenous switching model with a bivariate 
regime classification function. 
The joint densityA.) is assumed joint normal with mean vector zero 
and covariance matrix with typical element ui.  Following the conven- 
tional probit normalization, we set ull = u22 =  1. Because c3  and c4 
are never jointly  observed, u34  is  not  identified in this  model.  The 
parameter vector is thus 
= {p  19p2,aI ,a2,sf,sp7~127u13  7‘149u23,u33  ~~44). 
The likelihood function is maximized with respect to R using a modified 
scoring algorithm proposed by Berndt, et al. (1974). 
7.6  Data 
The primary data source used for estimation is the Current Population 
Survey (CPS) for the second quarter (April-June)  of 1982. This source 
has several advantages over other surveys. Sampling procedures based 
on rotation groups make it possible to match respondents in adjacent 
years. This permits creation of the large longitudinal file we need to 
classify observations by previous period employment status.  l7 Another 
advantage over other longitudinal data files (NLS, PSID) is that the 
CPS provides detailed information on the level (federal, state, or local) 
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The data used  include all respondents who worked in either the 
federal or private sectors in 1981 and also worked in either the federal 
or private sectors in 1982. Any individual that did not work in either 
year, or worked in state or local government in either year, is excluded. 
Although we recognize  that these exclusion restrictions are not ex- 
ogenous, the costs of taking explicit account of them are prohibitive. 
The sample contains 6,064 men and 4,561 women. Summary statistics 
for these data are contained in table 7.1. Definitions of most variables 
are obvious. The dependent variable is the natural log of  the hourly 
wage rate calculated by dividing usual weekly earnings by usual hours 
worked per week.  Region variables are based on census definitions, 
and unemployment rates are at the state level. The variable “Percent 
federal employment” is an index of the federal presence in each state 
obtained by dividing federal civilian employment by total employment 
in each state. Finally, the variable “Years of potential experience”  is 
calculated as age minus schooling minus 5. 
Teble 7.1  Summary Statistics 
Males  Females 
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Central city 




Percent federal employment 
Unemployment rate 
Years of education 






























































































Note: Omitted categories are “South” for the regional dummies and “Service”  for the 
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One potentially  important variable not included in our analysis is 
union status. This exclusion  may be defended on grounds that it is 
preferable to let union effects implicitly enter the model in  reduced 
form rather than deal directly with the endogeneity of union status. In 
any event, the absence of information on collective bargaining prohib- 
ited the analysis of union status.I9 
7.7  Results 
7.7.1  Parameter Estimates 
Equation (6) suggests that an individual's desire for employment in 
the public sector will depend on relative wage offers (Wf - Wp). Ac- 
cording to this formulation, a percentage increase in  Wf  will have the 
same effect as a percentage decrease of the same percentage magnitude 
in Wp. However, an empirical problem arises because of the omission 
of  relevant information on pensions and other nonwage forms of pe- 
cuniary compensation.  Theory  suggests an inverse  relationship be- 
tween wages and fringes in the compensation package. This prediction 
has received little empirical support (see Smith and Ehrenberg 1983). 
Instead, evidence indicates that the public sector (or high-wage em- 
ployers in general) may offer workers both high wages and attractive 
fringes.20  Moreover, the pension component of the compensation pack- 
age is often an actuarial (frequently linear) function of wage payments. 
This suggests workers will not be indifferent between changes in rel- 
ative wages due to changes in federal sector (high-fringe) wages on the 
one hand and private sector (low-fringe) wages on the other. To  allow 
for this possibility we generalize our empirical formulation of the job 
acceptance decision to permit asymmetric responses to public and pri- 
vate sector wages: 
(6')  PI = Xiel  + a{wf + afwp + el. 
Parameter estimates for this version of the model are presented in 
table 7.2 for males and table 7.3 for females. Columns (1) and (2) of 
each table present results for the job acceptance (PI)  and job offer (P2) 
equations. Remaining columns contain estimated wage functions for 
the federal sector (w9 and private sector (wp). Estimates of the aii  are 
presented at the bottom of each table. 
We first consider estimates for the job offer and acceptance decisions 
for males. Since most of the individual parameters are not of primary 
interest, we will be brief. Higher federal sector wage offers increase 
the probability a worker will desire to work in the public sector but 164  Steven F.  Venti 
Table 7.2  Parameter Estimates for Males 
Variable 
(1) 
Job  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Acceptance  Job Offer  Federal  Private 
Probability  Probability  Wage  Wage 




Widowed, divorced, or separated 
Central city 




Percent federal employment 
Unemployment rate 
Years of education 
(Years of education)2a 
Years of potential experience 
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Table 7.2  (continued) 
Variable 
(1) 
Job  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Acceptance  Job Offer  Federal  Private 
Probability  Probability  Wage  Wage 
(PI)  (P2)  (w3  (WP) 
Intercept 
Covariance Matrix 
Job acceptance (PI) 
Job offer (P2) 
Federal wage (w9 
Private wage (wp) 
-4.873  2.668  1.291 
(.733)  (.823)  (.183) 
1 .Ooo 
-  .868  1.000 
(.066) 
.053  -  .056  ,121 
(.  042)  (.037)  (.OW 
.081  -  ,266  - 




Log-likelihood function:  -  3,964.08 
Number of observations:  6,064 
Nm:  5,626 
Not:  25 
Nlo:  32 
Nil:  381 
Nore: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses 
"Scaled by 100. 
decrease the probability the worker will be hired. Worker preference 
for the public  sector decreases with the private  sector wage offer. 
Comparison of a-f  and  suggests worker choice is more sensitive to 
federal wages than to private sector wages. This difference may, as the 
previous discussion indicated, reflect more generous fringe benefits in 
the federal sector. 
Other estimates reveal that married or previously married individuals 
are more likely to desire employment in the federal sector than never- 
married individuals.  Nonwhites  are less likely to desire government 
employment but more likely to receive a public sector job offer. Work- 
ers in the South are both less likely to want and less likely to be offered 
federal jobs. The coefficient on the federal employment variable indi- 
cates that federal presence in a state strongly increases the likelihood 
of a federal job offer. 
We  present the estimated wage functions for males in columns three 
and four of table 7.2. Most parameters of the wage functions are pre- 
cisely measured. The estimated covariance parameters indicate wages, 
and the matching process are not independent. This relationship sug- 
gests that OLS estimates of sectoral wage functions may be biased. 166  Steven F.  Venti 
Table 7.3  Wrameter Estimates for Females 
Variable 
(1) 
Job  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Acceptance  Job Offer  Federal  Private 
Probability  Probability  Wage  Wage 
(PI)  (PA  (W’)  (WP) 
Nonwhite 
Married 
Widowed, divorced, or separated 
Central city 




Percent of federal employment 
Unemployment rate 
Years of education 
(Years of  education)*a 
Years of potential experience 





Operative or laborer 




Job acceptance (PI) 
,177 
(.179) 
-  .035 
(.OW 
-  ,006 
(.071) 
,644 
































-  .693 
(  ,295) 
- 1.073 
(.401) 
-  335 
(.353) 
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(.324) 
- 












-  ,036 


















(.  102) 
,138 
(.072) 









































(.080) 167  Wages in the Federal and Private Sectors 
Table 7.3  (continued) 
Variable 
(1) 
Job  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Acceptance  Job Offer  Federal  Private 
Probability  Probability  Wage  Wage 
(Pl)  (P2)  (4  (WP) 
Job offer (P2) 
Federal wage (wf) 
Private wage (wp) 
-  ,920  1 .Ooo 
(.051) 
-  .073  ,081  ,116 
(.048)  (.043)  (.013) 
,004  -  .146  -  .I35 
(.058)  (.066)  (.055) 
Log-likelihood Function:  -  2,727.74 
Number of observations:  4,561 
Nm:  4,339 
No1:  14 
N10:  16 
Nil:  192 
Note: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. 
aScaled by  100. 
We make some comparisons with OLS to investigate the extent of this 
bias in subsection 7.3. 
The parameter estimates indicate that wage functions in the federal 
and private sectors are slightly different in several respects. Nonwhites 
have an (insignificant) wage advantage in the federal sector but a wage 
disadvantage in the private sector. Federal wages appear to be lower 
outside of the South (which includes Washington, D.C.), but private 
sector wages are higher in all regions other than the South. The esti- 
mates indicate that an additional year of education adds 3.7 percent to 
wages in the federal sector and 4.5 percent in the private sector (eval- 
uated at means). An additional year of potential experience adds about 
1.1 percent to wages in each sector. 
For females the estimated a’s again have the expected signs. Most 
of the other coefficients in the job offer, acceptance, and wage equations 
are of the same sign and approximate magnitude as the coefficients for 
males. A notable exception is the curious effect of  education on the 
probability an individual will be offered a public sector job. For both 
males and females an additional year of education has the same effect 
on the job offer probability evaluated at mean (12.6) years of schooling. 
However, additional years of schooling beyond the sample mean have 
much larger positive effects on the job offer probability for men than 
for women.  Indeed, for women  the  effect  of  an additional year  of 
schooling turns negative at slightly under fifteen years of schooling. 168  Steven F.  Venti 
7.7.2  Direct Wage Comparisons 
The advantage of joint estimation of wage offer functions and the 
sectoral choice mechanism  is  that the biasing effect  of  unobserved 
worker quality is eliminated. As section 7.3  argues, the resulting “unex- 
plained”  wage differences may represent the combined effects of gov- 
ernment payment of quasi rents and equalizing differences. Direct wage 
comparisons  cannot  distinguish  between  these  effects.  However, 
“equal” wage structures is itself a current policy goal, so these wage 
comparisons indicate how this goal has been met. 
Before considering the estimates it is useful to clarify a problem of 
interpretation of  direct wage comparisons.  “Equal”  wage structures 
is taken to mean that a randomly chosen individual will face identical 
wage offers from each sector (G:  = w:).  This definition of  “equal” 
wages  implicitly takes a wage function based  on all  private  sector 
workers as the standard of comparison.Whether this should be so is a 
policy issue we do not address here. Previous analyses (Smith, Quinn) 
have used the average wage of all private sector workers as the stan- 
dard; to compare our findings with theirs, we continue this tradition. 
However, one may argue that the “correct”  comparison group should 
include state and local employees, or be limited to the unionized private 
sector, be restricted to large private employers, or contain only white 
males. Indeed, the puzzling question of why survey evidence used in 
federal wage policy (the PATC  Survey) suggests federal workers are 
“underpaid,”  yet estimates based on the CPS samples indicate federal 
workers are “overpaid,”  may be the result  of  different comparison 
groups (see Freeman  1984). In any event, the  standard used  in  this 
section is the wage function of a random sample of all private sector 
workers. Our primary concern is the effect of observed and unobserved 
productivity characteristics on sectoral wage differences. 
Predicted percentage wage differences between the federal and pri- 
vate  sectors are presented  in  table 7.4.21  The first row gives mean 
differences for each sex. In our sample, males in the federal sector 
average 32.8 percent more and females 38.7 percent more than their 
counterparts in the private sector. The second row of table 7.4  presents 
estimated federal-private differentials “adjusted” for differences in ob- 
served productivity-related characteristics of workers in each sector. 
These estimates, based on the wage regression approach, indicate that 
almost two-thirds  of  the male gross differential can be attributed to 
observed individual differences. The analogous figure for females is 
about 40 percent. Finally, parameter estimates from the model jointly 
estimating wage functions and the sectoral choice mechanism (row 4) 
suggest that the “unexplained” wage difference is 4.2 percent for males 
and 22.1 percent for females.22 169  Wages in the Federal and Private Sectors 
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Table 7.4  Predicted Percentage FederaUPrivate Wage Differences 












Note:  Standard errors in parentheses. 
=Unadjusted. 
bAdjusted  for observed productivity characteristics listed in column (3) of tables 7.2 and 
7.3. 
=Adjusted  for observed productivity characteristics listed in column (3) of tables 7.2 and 
7.3 and indicators of  part-time work, widowed, divorced, or separated, married, two 
urbanization dummies, and five additional product terms between the included variables. 
dAdjusted for observed productivity characteristics listed in column (3) of tables 7.2 and 
7.3 and unobserved productivity differences. 
It  is  interesting to compare  these  findings to  the  most  recently 
published  results  (using  1978 data) of  Smith  (1981). Employing the 
wage regression technique, she finds a wage advantage of  10 percent 
to  11 percent  for males  and 20  percent to 21  percent  for females. 
These figures are remarkably close to our reported  OLS results  in 
row 2 of table 7.4. However, an important difference between these 
findings and those of Smith is that she specified her wage equations 
with twelve variables (mostly quadratic and product terms involving 
experience, education, and marital status) not included in our spec- 
ification. Row 3 of  table 7.4 presents  the results  of  adding most of 
these same variables to our OLS wage functions. The wage advantage 
increases slightly to 12.1 percent for males and drops to 20.3 percent 
for females. 
The comparison between rows 2 and 3 suggests that wage regres- 
sion estimates of the wage advantage may  not be very  sensitive to 
omitted  variables. (Many of the variables included in row 3 but not 
in  row  2 are highly  significant.) Therefore  it  is  surprising  that  the 
maximum likelihood  (ML) correction  for unobservables  further re- 
duces the  wage  advantage  for  males.  Although  computation  costs 
prohibited inclusion of a variable list as exhaustive as Smith’s in our 
ML model, the OLS results suggest that the addition of these vari- 
ables would probably  have little effect.  Thus observed  wage differ- 
ences appear attributable to unobserved as well as observed produc- 
tivity differences for males, but for females the effect of unobserved 
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7.7.3  Simulated Probabilities and Queues 
If  employers pay no equalizing differences for sectoral differences 
in  nonwage job attributes, the earlier figures represent our best esti- 
mates of the federal-private wage advantage. If this is not the case, we 
need an alternative indicator of  the  “comparability”  of  wages.  One 
such indicator is the length of queues for federal sector jobs. 
Recall that neither the job acceptance nor the job offer decisions are 
directly observed. We  can use the parameter estimates of  the model 
to simulate these events. In table 7.5 we present predicted marginal 
probabilities  of job acceptance and job offer. These predictions are 
obtained by  calculating probabilities for each member of the sample 
and then averaging. 
The first entry in this table indicates that the average predicted prob- 
ability of job acceptance of males in the sample was 0. 18.23  Our inter- 
pretation is that  18 percent of all sample men would accept a federal 
sector job if  offered. The analogous figure for females is a bit higher, 
about 29 percent. This suggests that federal-private wage differentials 
are more attractive to women in this sample. 
The job offer probabilities presented in the second row indicate that 
83 percent of all males would be acceptable to federal employers, but 
only 67 percent of females would be hired. This reflects the expected 
“reverse”  sorting in  the  matching process,  that  is, most measured 
personal  characteristics  have opposite effects in  the acceptance and 
offer decisions. In addition, the estimated correlations between unob- 
served factors entering each decision are also negative (- 0.87 for males 
Table 7.5  Simulated Probabilities 
Males  Females 
(1) Probability of 
(2) Probability of 
(3) Joint probability of 
(4) Length of queue 
job acceptance (PI) 
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and -  0.92 for females). Thus those individuals most likely to desire a 
federal sector job are also least likely to be offered a federal sector 
job. This pattern is most striking when the joint probability  of  being 
offered a job and accepting a job (the probability of  being employed 
in the federal sector) is considered. Ifjoining the queue (job  acceptance) 
and being chosen from the queue (job offer) were independent, the 
probability of  observing a worker in the federal sector would simply 
be the product of marginal probabilities: 0.134 for males and 0.160 for 
females.24  However, neither the acceptance nor offer decisions are pure 
random behavior, so the predicted joint probability based on the neg- 
ative estimated correlation is 0.064 for males and 0.047 for females 
(row 3). 
These simulated probabilities provide useful new information about 
the matching process. Yet they do not say much about whether wages 
are “comparable”  between  sectors.  We  can attempt to answer this 
more difficult question by noting that if the public-private wage differ- 
ential observed in the sample exceeds the equalizing difference that 
must be paid to attract workers to the federal sector, then queues for 
federal sector jobs will result. If  we ignore worker quality and con- 
centrate on numbers of workers, we  are able to obtain an informal 
measure of the length of the queue by comparing the fraction of the 
work force desiring government employment (at sample wages) to the 
fraction that is employed in the federal sector. 
This indicator of the length of the queue, calculated as Pr(P, > O)/ 
Pr(P1 > 0,  P2 > 0),  is presented in the last row of table 7.5.  This expres- 
sion is the inverse of the probability that a worker desiring a federal 
sector job will be chosen from the implicit queue. Roughly three times 
as many men would be willing to work at the sample wage differential 
as will be hired at that differential. The analogous figure for women is 
double that of men. 
7.7.4  An Alternative Indicator of Comparability 
An alternative approach to comparability can be based on a simple 
supply argument: a cost-minimizing federal employer would pay wages 
no higher than necessary to attract the required work force and elim- 
inate the queues described  earlier.  This approach has  considerable 
theoretical appeal. In particular, the inability of the wage regression 
approach  to distinguish  between payment  of  rents and payment  of 
equalizing differences for job attributes is no longer a problem because 
each individual’s choice of sector is based on an implicit valuation of 
both the wage and nonwage aspects of jobs. 
This supply principle can be made operational by using the parameter 
estimates obtained in section 7.6 to simulate the employment effects 
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policies that alter federal wages by the same percentage amount for all 
individuals. Other policies that alter the return to individual attributes 
or otherwise result in different percentage changes across individuals 
are not considered. In the notation of the wage offer functions discussed 
earlier, all changes in federal wages are obtained by altering the intercept. 
Let C be the proportion of male (or female) workers employed in the 
federal sector. The probability of job acceptance can be rewritten (using 
equation 6’ as 
(12)  Pli = F[x;pl  + ..f(${  + k) + afvy], 
where F[.]  denotes the normal distribution function and the new term, 
k, approximates a constant (across individuals) percentage change in 
the federal wage offer. 
Given the parameter estimates, we can use equation (12) to simulate 
the number of persons desiring employment in the government sector 
for any change in federal wage offers. In particular, the federal wage 
reduction that eliminates queues is given by the k that satisfies (1/N) 
2 P,, = E. This procedure yields values of k of about minus 16 percent 
for males and minus 42 percent for females, which suggests that the 
federal government could continue to attract a work force of  current 
size with substantially lower wages. 
Several important issues are raised by these figures. First, since the 
simulation procedure fixes the level of employment but not labor “qual- 
ity,” one consequence of lower federal wages may be deterioration of 
the quality of  the federal work force.  The severity of  this problem 
depends on the relative importance of the federal wage structure (W! 
and hiring standards (Pl)  in determining who enters and is chosen from 
queues. As an empirical matter the “quality” effect has been minimized 
by considering only constant percentage changes in wages. Apparently 
the number of individuals desiring employment in the federal sector is 
primarily a function of  the wage level, and the “quality” (attributes) 
of individuals desiring federal employment is more strongly related to 
the wage structure  (the relative  valuation of individual attributes by 
each sector). A comparison of simulated work forces before and after 
the wage reduction indicates that the quality problem is not  severe. 
For example, the 16 percent wage reduction for males will reduce the 
average level of  education of  the male federal work force from  13.9 
years to 13.8 years. Comparable figures based on the 42 percent wage 
reduction for women are  13.1 and  12.8. Levels of work  experience 
were slightly higher for the low-wage federal work force than for the 
high-wage work force. 
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Another issue is the particularly large response for women. Perhaps 
the most likely explanation is our choice of a private sector comparison 
group (see the discussion in  section 7.7.2). If  the private  sector is 
imperfect (unions, discrimination, monopoly, etc.), the wage the gov- 
ernment must offer to attract workers will be affected. For instance, 
if  sex or race discrimination exists in the private sector, the price the 
federal sector must  pay  for its work  force will  be  lower. Although 
payment of these lower wages may be cost-effective given the imper- 
fections in the private sector, it may be legally or politically inappro- 
priate for the federal government to simply match (or slightly exceed) 
discriminatory wages. Thus perhaps some of the apparent government 
wage advantage, particularly for females, can be attributed to imper- 
fections in the private sector labor market. Our results may indicate 
that the private sector “underpays”  certain groups of workers. 
Finally, two additional limitations of the model may also be relevant. 
First, some of the assumptions required to calculate k are not likely to 
be satisfied. In particular, we have implicitly assumed that the demand 
curve for public employees is perfectly  inelastic: as relative  wages 
change, the “target”  employment level 2 remains fixed. Finally, we 
note once again that the role  of  pensions in  the public  sector may 
complicate our interpretation of relative wage differences. 
7.8  Summary 
Our empirical effort is directed toward two goals. First, we seek to 
determine if  wage structures in the federal and private sectors have 
been “equalized”  by the federal comparability process.  Our second 
goal is to develop a more choice-theoretic approach to the issue of 
wage comparability. A difficulty with previous work is that when mar- 
kets do not clear, as is likely to be the case for the public sector, the 
conventional wage regression approach to comparability is unable to 
distinguish equalizing differences from quasi rents. Explicit modeling 
of worker and employer choices appears to be an appealing alternative. 
With respect to the first goal, a comparison of 1982 wages for federal 
workers and all private sector workers suggests wages were not equal. 
Although much of the gross differential in average wages can be ex- 
plained by differences in observed and unobserved attributes of work- 
ers in each sector, federal sector wage advantages of about 4 percent 
for males and 22 percent for females remained unexplained. 
With respect to the second goal, we formulate and estimate a model 
permitting prediction  of the wage differential that eliminates implicit 
queues for federal sector jobs. The estimates suggest that the elimi- 
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for both sexes.Subject to limitations detailed in section 7.7, the sim- 
ulations suggest that the federal sector is able to attract a work force 
of current size and roughly current “quality” by offering average wages 
16 percent lower than the 1982 level for men and 42 percent lower for 
women. 
Notes 
This paper was prepared for the NBER Conference on Public Sector  Payrolls, 
held  in  Williamsburg,  Va.,  November  15-17,  1984.  Useful  comments were 
provided by Tom  Barthold, Alan Gustman, Jane Mather,  Sharon Smith, and 
conference participants.  Partial  support from the Faculty Committee on Re- 
search at Dartmouth College is gratefully acknowledged. 
1. Federal Salary Reform Act of  1962. 
2. This is the standard method  of estimating equalizing differences  in the 
private sector where observed wage differentials can be assumed to be “equi- 
librium” differences. See Smith 1979, Brown 1980, and Duncan and Holmlund 
1983 for examples.  Quinn  1979 makes some adjustments for public-private 
differences in nonwage job attributes. See also Bellante and Link 1981. 
3. See President’s Panel on Federal Compensation  1976, chap. 2. This is a 
brief description  of GS pay determination.  FWS pay  rates are set to be “in 
line with  prevailing  levels for comparable work  within  a local  wage  area.” 
Postal service rates are set by collective bargaining, although “On a standard 
of comparability to the compensation and benefits paid for comparable levels 
of work in the private sector of the economy.” 
4.  See Smith  1977, 1982 and President’s  Panel  on  Federal  Compensation 
1976, chap. 5. The most important is the minimum establishment  size, which 
leads to oversampling of high-pay employers. Another problem is the lack of 
information on fringe benefits. 
5. Alternatively, wage functions can be estimated for public sector employ- 
ees, and the estimated coefficients can be used to predict what private sector 
workers would earn in the public sector. See Smith 1977, 49-52. 
6. See Smith 1979 or Rosen  1983. 
7. We  ignore the index number problem of choosing a base. 
8. See, for example, Heckman 1979. 
9.  The d say nothing  about individual  preferences for wages  versus job 
attributes unless preferences are homogenous in the population or  the particular 
individual is at the margin between sectors. 
10.  In the short run  we assume federal employers cannot use  the wage 
mechanism to shorten the queue. This seems to be an accurate description of 
pay procedures for lower- and middle-level jobs, but it may be less valid for 
upper-level jobs. 
11. A more elaborate and complete model specifying the mechanisms gov- 
erning wage adjustments at the macrolevel is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
12. We  omit the individual subscript where no ambiguity will result. 
13. P2 also indicates whether workers who do not enter the queue (PI  5 0) 
would be chosen were they to enter the queue. Thus P2 should not be inter- 
preted as conditional on being in the queue. 175  Wages in the Federal and Private Sectors 
14. Empirical investigations of similar models in which wages enter in re- 
duced form are Abowd and Farber 1982 and Farber 1983. 
15. See Office of Personnel Management 1983. The assumption is similar to 
the “job rights”  assumption of Abowd and Farber 1982. 
16. Although period t -  1 employment status is used to  classify observations, 
we do not condition on prior employment  status. Thus all arguments in the 
following probability expressions pertain to period t. 
17. Only about 15 percent of the respondents can be matched across one 
year (rotation groups four and eight). To obtain a large enough file we combined 
three monthly surveys. 
18. Information on level of government has always been collected as part 
of the CPS, but until  1979 this information was available  only sporadically. 
Availability of this information gives us a distinct advantage over some previous 
efforts using the CPS to analyse federal-private differentials in which only half 
of all public sector workers could be identified by industrial classification. 
19. One-third of our sample has recorded union status. These are not enough 
observations for a meaningful analysis. Both the rate of unionization and the 
nature of  unionization  differ  between the public  and  private  sectors. Thus 
unions may offer an “explanation” for noncomparability  of  wages. See Eh- 
renberg and Schwarz, n.d. 
20. In particular, federal pension contributions measured as a proportion of 
wages are several times greater than private sector contributions. See Leonard 
1983 and Smeeding 1983. 
21. Percentage changes are calculated as (em - 1) where m is the difference 
in logs. 
22. The last row of table 7.4 is calculated  as 6f  - *p  = X(fV - a).  To 
obtain the standard error of this estimate we first calculate va3q - p)  = C 
from the covariance matrix of parameters. The reported standard error is the 
square root of XTX. 
23. This probability  is not conditional on a job offer. Also, all probabilities 
are evaluated at the appropriate adjusted sample wage differences. 
24. The joint probability is calculated for each member of  the sample and 
then  averaged.  In a heterogeneous population  this joint probability  will not 
equal the product of the two average marginal probabilities. 
-  *- 
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Comment  Sharon P.  Smith 
It is now more than twenty years since Pres. John F. Kennedy called 
for action to assure that “federal pay rates be comparable with private 
enterprise rates for the same level of work” (U.S.  Civil Service Com- 
mission, 1968, p. 27). The present system for setting federal pay evolved 
in  an attempt to implement this policy statement. However, even in 
1962 when President Kennedy proclaimed the Comparability Doctrine, 
it was not a new idea for a guiding principle for federal pay policy. 
Instead, this concept can be traced to an 1862 law requiring that the 
wages of  federal blue-collar workers “conform with those of private 
establishments in the immediate vicinity”  (U.S. Civil Service Com- 
mission, 1968, p. 27). 
The persistence of comparability as the guiding principle for federal 
pay policy-though  not in recent years, the actual practice, as will be 
discussed later-has  inspired a large body of research evaluating its 
effectiveness.’ Chapter 7 by Steven F. Venti makes a valuable contri- 
bution to this literature by providing more current estimates of federal- 
private pay differentials and by giving more explicit attention to the 
effects of differences between the two sectors in unmeasured produc- 
tivity and in nonpecuniary job attributes. In addition, Venti offers a 
challenging “supply side” interpretation of comparability and tests its 
implications for actual federal pay levels. Although I do not fully agree 
with this  supply orientation-as  I shall detail later-its  presentation 
and discussion offer a useful vehicle for reconsidering both the impli- 
cations of comparability as it is presently implemented and its ultimate 
validity as a principle for pay policy. 
The rationale for comparability as a pay policy is relatively simple: 
since government is not a profit-making enterprise, there is no market 
discipline to help guide pay setting. Consequently, government can turn 
to the private sector-where  wages are disciplined by market forces- 
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for guidance. Although this rationale appears simple, in practice, com- 
parability has evolved into a convoluted process for pay setting. 
Under the original formulation of the comparability doctrine for blue- 
collar workers, each federal agency set its own wages using different 
job definitions. As a result, wage differentials appeared between similar 
federal jobs in  different agencies in the same locality. By  1964 these 
differentials had grown to as much as $0.64 an hour-an  enormous 
amount in view of  the fact that the minimum wage at that time was 
$1.25 an hour. The reforms in federal pay policy enacted in the 1960s 
attempted to correct the problems that had crept into the application 
of  the comparability  principle to blue-collar workers, to extend the 
principle to other federal workers as well, and to correct supply short- 
ages that were appearing at certain skill levels of white-collar workers. 
However, a murkiness reflecting conflicting goals has crept into the 
present application of comparability.* 
A  number  of  conceptual  and  technical  difficulties-which  I  have 
documented elsewhere (Smith 1977, 23-34)-hinder  the practical ap- 
plication of  the comparability principle.  Major problems include the 
fact that the presence of noncompetitive forces in the private sector- 
such as the presence of unions or of race or sex discrimination-may 
produce wages different from those reflecting the free play of  com- 
petitive  forces sought by  the comparability  process.’  Moreover, the 
comparability  system, as presently  enacted,  ignores  differences  be- 
tween the sectors both  in  fringe benefits and in  other nonpecuniary 
returns. At the technical end, there appear to be a number of problems 
in the survey universe used to sample private sector wages; thus the 
resulting estimate is likely to be biased upward. The net result of these 
conceptual  and  technical  problems  is  that  even  when  fully  imple- 
mented, the Comparability process has not been successful in attaining 
its policy goal, but instead produces federal wages that are as much as 
20  percent higher than those paid comparable private sector workers 
(Smith 1982, 273-77).  Indeed, the failure to make a strict “compara- 
bility” adjustment to federal pay scales in any year since 1976 has been 
attributed at least in part to a recognition of this bias (Office  of Personnel 
Management 1984, 3). Nevertheless, use of such an ad hoc means of 
correcting for upward bias in the process makes the full effect in terms 
of relative wage patterns extremely difficult to project. 
Therefore, with federal pay increases manipulated to satisfy policy 
goals unrelated to the needs or preferences of  federal employers or 
employees, a fresh set of estimates of comparative federal and private 
pay patterns  is needed. This alone would  validate  Venti’s research. 
However, Venti has also added two new dimensions to this research. 
First, in an attempt to measure both observed and unobserved worker 
quality  in  his wage comparisons,  Venti goes beyond the customary 179  Wages in the Federal and Private Sectors 
observation that the estimating equations do not measure all the po- 
tential differences in quality between workers in the two sectors. Sec- 
ond, Venti observes that a policy of equal wages in the federal and 
private sectors may.  be inappropriate because nonpecuniary aspects of 
employment differ between the two sectors. Instead, he suggests that 
a  supply side interpretation  should  be  considered:  Are  wages  high 
enough to attract the required number of workers? 
Taking a fresh approach to the study of  federal-private pay differ- 
entials, Venti has noted that these wage differences can be attributed 
to four potential sources: observed productivity or skill differentials; 
unobserved productivity or skill differentials; equalizing differences in 
pay for nonpecuniary job attributes; and quasi rents or overpayments 
to government employees. The bulk of the prior empirical research in 
this area has concentrated on the first and the last sources of overall 
differentials. Where the other two sources are acknowledged, they have 
generally been discounted as unmeasurable and unlikely to have sig- 
nificant impact in most instances. 
Not content with this reasoning, Venti makes a commendable attempt 
to account for each of these sources of wage differences between the 
public and the private sectors by jointly estimating wage functions and 
sectoral choice mechanisms. However, it must be emphasized that in 
the case of the second source of wage differences-unobserved  pro- 
ductivity or skill differentials-this  problem is not unique to a study 
of  government wage differentials but rather applies to the analysis of 
wages for any two different workers. It is simply impossible to measure 
and take account in a wage regression of all the sources of difference 
in worker quality or productivity. 
Venti’s estimates suggest that unobserved skill differentials have little 
explanatory power for the female federal wage advantage but explain 
a substantial portion of the male federal wage advantage. One possible 
explanation for these differing impacts is the effect of  unions, which 
unfortunately cannot be accounted for in this data set. My research 
has suggested that the wage advantage enjoyed by male federal workers 
(whether in the postal service or in other federal employment) is roughly 
equal to that enjoyed by comparable unionized private sector workers, 
whereas the wage advantage enjoyed by female federal workers (in 
nonpostal employment) is sharply larger than  that enjoyed by com- 
parable unionized private sector workers (Smith 1977,120-29). In other 
words, the unobserved productivity or skill differentials may largely 
reflect the effects of union membership, which is a much more impor- 
tant influence on the wages of private sector males than of any other 
group. 
The underlying reasoning for Venti’s suggestion that a supply side 
orientation provides a more appropriate approach for the comparability 180  Steven F.  Venti 
doctrine derives from a recognition  that  sector of  employment is a 
choice variable-unlike  race or sex, for which the decomposition anal- 
ysis to provide  estimates of explained  and unexplained  wage differ- 
entials originated. Thus, in choosing a particular sector of employment, 
an individual is expressing a preference for a certain package of wages 
and nonpecuniary  benefits.  Consequently, part of  any public-private 
wage difference may be an equalizing difference for nonwage job at- 
tributes. A policy of wage equalization across the sectors then may be 
both inequitable and inefficient. Thus Venti suggests that it  is more 
appropriate to determine the differential that sets wages just high enough 
to attract the required number of workers. Indeed, Venti maintains that 
such a supply orientation was the original motivation for the compar- 
ability policy. 
Certainly  it  is true that the nonpecuniary characteristics  of  a job 
differ across sectors. An efficient wage policy must make some allow- 
ance for the impact of nonpecuniary advantages and disadvantages of 
employment because these influence the job acceptance decision. At 
the same time, however,  such differences are not unique to the dis- 
tinction between federal and private employment. Indeed, the differ- 
ences may be greater between two private sector employers than be- 
tween the federal government and a private firm; such differences have 
a part in most firms’ wage policies. Moreover, certain of  these non- 
pecuniary factors, which are unobservable to researchers, may also be 
unknown to individuals until after they hold the job in question. In that 
case the nonpecuniary factor is unlikely to play much of a role in the 
job acceptance decision. 
Nevertheless, to advocate a wage policy that, after allowing for the 
influence of the nonpecuniary advantages of federal employment, pro- 
poses paying wages just high enough to attract the required number of 
workers,  ignores  the quality  implications of  such an approach, the 
ambiguity of  the wage level it  implies,  and its  divergence from the 
original specification of the comparability principle (as quoted in the 
first sentence of  these comments). The level of  wages an employer 
chooses to offer potential employees and the relationship of that wage 
to the level prevailing in the market from which that  employer can 
draw workers have clear  implications for the quality of  workers at- 
tracted to a particular job and the length of the interested queue. How- 
ever, while offering wages significantly above the market norm will 
likely result in a long queue of  potential employees of above-average 
quality, it does not guarantee a superior-quality work force. Instead, 
it is the hiring decision that determines whether or not the relevant 
employees are of  superior quality. Moreover, this  supply side inter- 
pretation which Venti advocates offers too vague a guideline for the 
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about the quality of workers preferred and the labor supply conditions 
(whether surplus or shortage) prevailing in the relevant market. Finally, 
the original statement of the comparability principle offered such an 
explicit statement; I find it impossible to  justify any other interpretation 
of the doctrine than that federal workers should be paid the average 
rate prevailing for comparable jobs with private sector employers. 
From the employer’s perspective, Comparability was intended to be 
an efficient pay  policy  that would  assure government that it  could 
attract sufficient numbers of qualified workers to fill its staffing needs, 
which is very much in keeping with Venti’s interpretation.  However, 
this is only part of  the policy’s purpose.  From the employee’s per- 
spective, it was supposed to be an equitable pay policy that would 
assure workers  that  they  would not  suffer a wage disadvantage by 
working for the federal government. Consequently, to advocate Venti’s 
supply side view is to take an incomplete interpretation of the com- 
parability policy and its implications. 
Venti relies on this supply side interpretation to formulate and es- 
timate a model to predict the wage differential between federal and 
private sectors that would account for the influence of  nonpecuniary 
characteristics of employment, but still eliminate queues for federal 
jobs.  I have long advocated reforms in federal pay  that would help 
eliminate these queues. However,  Venti suggests  that these queues 
could be eliminated if the wages of male federal workers were reduced 
16 percent and the wages of female federal workers were reduced 42 
percent. Such a policy hardly seems a viable governmental reform since 
part of the difference in the relative positions of males and females is 
due to the fact that sex discrimination appears less intense in the federal 
than in the private sector (Smith 1977, 106-14). 
The problems with the comparability process that were recognized 
more than a decade ago have not disappeared but rather have become 
even more complex and worthy of immediate legislation. Despite the 
reservations I have discussed, I believe Venti’s chapter makes an in- 
teresting and valuable contribution to our knowledge and understanding 
in this area and provides a fresh perspective for considering what fed- 
eral pay policy really says and what it should really mean. 
Notes 
I. See Smith 1977; Quinn 1979; Hartman and Weber 1980; and Borjas 1980. 
2. In practice, the comparability process does not proceed automatically. In 
the event of a national emergency, or because of general economic conditions, 
the president  can propose  an alternative pay  plan  to the full comparability 
adjustment. However, the adoption of  an alternative pay plan has become the 
rule  rather than  the exception: it  has occurred in eight  of  the last  ten  pay 
decisions.  Such a practice  suggests that the federal pay policy is being used 182  Steven F.  Venti 
to serve other policy purposes than to attract and retain adequate numbers of 
competent employees. Indeed, further evidence of  this  distortion  of  policy 
goals can be found in President Reagan’s December 1984 budget proposal which 
called for a 5 percent cut in federal wages-the  first such cut since 1932-to 
take effect in January 1986 as a means of trimming the federal deficit. 
3. See U.S. GAO, 1973, p. 5, for further discussion of this intended goal of 
the comparability process. 
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